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SECURITY DEVICES
Michael H. Rubin*
SURETYSHIP
Because suretyship is a contract, there must be both an offer
and an acceptance. An offer is irrevocable for a reasonable period of
time.' Acceptance of an offer may be made through an express writ-
ten statement 2 or through actions that necessarily imply acceptance
when the parties contemplate such actions will suffice.'
Travelers Indemnity Company v. Ducote' involved a perfor-
mance bond for a livestock dealer. The bonding company required,
prior to the bond's being issued, that the defendants indemnify it
from loss through suretyship agreements. The defendant sureties
claimed that their contracts never became binding because the bond-
ing company did not notify them it had issued the performance
bond. The court found that the contracts executed by the defendants
showed that they did not expect and were not to receive any writ-
ten notice of acceptance; mere issuance of the performance bond was
sufficient for acceptance. Therefore, the court found the defendants
liable on their indemnity agreement.'
In the last five years the Louisiana Supreme Court has rendered
three significant decisions that have attempted to harmonize the
conflicting requirements of the Louisiana Civil Code articles on
suretyship,' the Louisiana Civil Code articles on solidary
obligations,' and contracts by which a surety binds himself in solido
with the principal obligor.
By definition, a surety's obligation is accessory to that of the
*Member, Baton Rouge Bar; Special Lecturer in Law, Louisiana State University.
1. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1801, 1804, & 1809.
2. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1811-14.
3. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1811, 1816, & 1817.
4. 380 So. 2d 10 (La. 1980).
5. Compare this case with L. D. Brinkman & Co. v. Cash & Carry Building
Materials Co., Inc., 377 So. 2d 415 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1979), in which it was held that the
guarantor for an open account was not liable because he never received any notifica-
tion of acceptance of his offer to become a guarantor and because, from the terms of
this contract, the creditor should have known that an express notice of acceptance was
required. The guaranty was by one of two sole shareholders of a corporation; the
guarantor ceased to be a shareholder prior to the extension of credit.
6. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 3035-70.
7. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2091-2110.
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principal debtor.' A surety has a right of discussion, the ability to
require the creditor to proceed against the debtor's other assets;9
division, the right to require the creditor to proceed against each
surety for his virile share; '° and indemnity, the ability of the surety,
regardless of the actions of the creditor, to receive full reimburse-
ment from the principal debtor."
The first of the supreme court's decisions was Louisiana Bank
and Trust Company, Crowley v. Boutte." Four stockholders signed a
single continuing guaranty agreement containing language by which
they bound themselves in solido with the debtor corporation. After
filing suit, the bank released with the corporation and three of the
four shareholders, specifically reserving its right against the fourth
shareholder. The court held that the language of the continuing
guaranty agreement 3 allowed the creditor to view the debtor and
all shareholders as solidary obligors rather than as principal debtor
and sureties. Since the creditor had expressly reserved his rights in
accordance with Civil Code article 2203, the remaining shareholder
was bound even though the corporate borrower was released. The
court did not have before it either the issue of the amount of the re-
maining shareholder's liability or the question of what rights, if any,
the shareholder retained to recover monies from the corporation or
the other shareholders.'"
The second case, Aiavolasiti v. Versailles Gardens Land
Development Company,5 involved three separate transactions con-
8. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3035.
9. LA. CiV. CODE arts. 3045-48.
10. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 3049-50.
11. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3057.
12. 309 So.2d 274 (La. 1975). The Boutte case was the object of some criticism. See
The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1974-1975 Term-Security
Devices, 36 LA. L. REV. 437 (1976); Comment, The Extinction of the Surety's Obliga-
tion, 23 LOY L. REV. 539 (1977); Note, Right of the Solidary Surety: Louisiana Bank &
Trust Co. v. Boutte, 36 LA. L. REV. 279 (1975); Note, Security Rights-Suretyship--
Release of Principal Debtor Does Not Discharge Solidary Surety, 49 TUL. L. REV. 1187
(1975).
13. We do furthermore bind and obligate ourselves, our heirs and assigns in solido
with said debtor, for the payment of the said indebtedness precisely as if the
same had been contracted and was due or owing by us in person hereby agreeing
to and binding ourselves, our heirs and assigns, by all terms and conditions con-
tained in any note or notes signed or to be signed by said debtor, making
ourselves party thereto . ...
309 So. 2d at 276 n.1.
14. The court attempted to indicate, in obiter dictum, that the remaining
shareholder did have some rights. 309 So. 2d at 278-79. The court's dictum, however,
raised more questions than it answered. See note 12, supra.
15. 371 So. 2d 755 (La. 1979). The Aiavolasiti case also generated much comment
and criticism. See The Work of the Appellate Courts for 1978-1979 Term-Security
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sisting of both promissory notes and continuing guaranty agree-
ments. All the contracts contained language by which sureties or en-
dorsers bound themselves in solido with the principal debtor." Reaf-
firming Boutte, the court in Aiavolasiti reasoned that when a surety
signs a contract binding himself in solido with the principal debtor,
the creditor may view all of the parties as solidary obligors; as be-
tween sureties themselves, however, and as between the sureties
and the debtor, the rules of suretyship continue to apply.
The third and most recent case is First National Bank of
Crowley v. Green Garden Processing Company, Inc.17 Three share-
holders signed separate but identical continuing guaranty agree-
ments binding themselves in solido with the corporate borrower."
After suit was filed one of the shareholders received a bankruptcy
discharge and another was released. It is not clear from the court's
opinion whether the release was with or without a reservation of
rights. Amazingly, the court did not refer to either Boutte, or
Aiavolasiti or to any other Louisiana Supreme Court case dealing
with the rights of sureties who sign a contract imparting solidary
liability. 9 The court ruled, solely on the basis of the contractual
language, that the remaining shareholder was liable to the bank for
100% of the amount stated in the guaranty agreement."
Devices, 40 LA. L. REV. 572 (1980) [hereinafter cited as 1978-1979 Term]; Note,
Aiavolasiti: A Conflict Resolved, A Conflict Ignored, 40 LA. L. REV. 483 (1980); Note,
Louisiana Supreme Court Clarifies the Solidary Surety's Right to Contribution, 25
Loy L. REV. (1979).
16. The continuing guaranty agreements provided:
[Aind I hereby bind and obligate myself, my heirs and assigns, in solido with said
debtor, for payment of any such indebtedness or liability precisely as if the same
had been contracted and was due or owing by me in person, hereby agreeing to,
and binding myself, my heirs and assigns, by all the terms and conditions con-
tained in any note or notes or other obligation or obligations signed or to be signed
by said debtor, making myself a party thereto ....
371 So. 2d at 757 n.2.
17. 387 So. 2d 1070 (La. 1980). This case will be noted in a later issue of this
Review.
18. I do furthermore bind and obligate myself, my heirs and assigns in solido with
said debtor, for payment of the said indebtedness precisely as if the same had
been contracted and was due and owing by me in person, hereby agreeing to and
binding myself, my heirs and assigns, by all terms and conditions contained in any
note or notes signed or to be signed by said debtor, making myself a party
thereto ....
Id. at 1072 n.3.
19. See, e.g., Brock v. First State Bank, 187 La. 766, 175 So. 569 (1937); Leigh v.
Wright, 183 La. 765, 164 So. 794 (1935); Hibernia Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Succession
of Cancienne, 140 La. 969, 74 So. 267 (1917); Union Nat'l Bank v. Legendre, 35 La. Ann.
787, 792 (1883).
20. Concerning the Bank's right to release sureties, the Continuing Guaranty
provides:
The Bank may ... release or discharge endorsers, guarantors or other parties ...
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW [Vol. 41
While the court's enforcement of the parties' contract strength-
ens a creditor's rights and gives full meaning to the usual boiler-
plate provisions contained in lenders' standard continuing guaranty
forms, the result does little to aid the analysis of this developing
area of Louisiana law. The language of the contract in Green Garden
is almost identical to that in Boutte.21 Under the analysis of the
court in Boutte, release of one of the "solidary sureties" with a
reservation of rights would extinguish at least a portion of the re-
maining "solidary surety's" liability." Perhaps this is the reason
that the Green Garden court did not refer to Boutte. On the other
hand, the court may have been attempting to overrule Boutte sub
silentio by returning to the principles of "simple" suretyship. A
"simple" surety (i.e., one whose contract merely binds him to pay if
the principal obligor does not) is not relieved of liability regardless
of either the number of other sureties or the release of other
sureties. The "simple" surety remains liable for the full extent of
the obligation stated in his suretyship contract subject only to a
dollar-for-dollar credit for payments made by the other sureties or
by the debtor.23
Perhaps the court was concerned with conflicting public policy
considerations. A contract forms the law between the parties;
without notice to the undersigned, such notice being hereby specifically waived....
We consider this provision to give the Bank the right to release sureties as it
deems appropriate without affecting its right to full recovery from [the remaining
shareholder] of [the corporation's] debt up to the dollar limits set in the contract.
387 So. 2d at 1073.
21. See notes 13 & 18, supra.
22. One of the significant problems with the Boutte analysis is that it grants to
the principal debtor the same reduction of his virile share of liability as that granted
to the "solidary surety." Using Boutte's analysis, the principal debtor benefits every
time a "solidary surety" is released. For example, if there is a principal debtor and
three "solidary sureties," Boutte would require that the creditor treat them all as
solidary obligors and apply those Civil Code articles to determine his rights. If the
creditor released one of the "solidary sureties" with a reservation of rights, he would
reduce not only his claim against the remaining "solidary sureties," but also his claim
against the principal debtor. Indeed, this was precisely the result reached in Wisconsin
Capital Corp. v. Trans World Land Title Corp., 378 So. 2d 495 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979).
This strange and perhaps unintended result of Boutte's reasoning leaves the two
disparate approaches, depending upon one's point of view. The debtor, following
Boutte, should insist that the creditor take 99 "solidary sureties" and then release all
but one of them. This would reduce the debtor's liability to a mere 2/100th of the
original obligation. The creditor, on the other hand, never would want to release any
surety, thus hindering commerce and impairing the credit standing of those sureties
who otherwise would be released.
23. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2206. Of course, in the case of multiple sureties, the surety
also has the right of division. LA. Civ. CODE arts. 3049-50.
24. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1901.
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therefore, courts strive to enforce it. A contract of suretyship
(whether it is denoted "continuing guaranty" or whether it contains
language binding the individual solidarily with the principal obligor)
is a security device that both requires a creditor to work precisely
within defined legal limits and entitles the surety to an interpreta-
tion of the agreement most advantageous to him2" so as to limit his
liability.
The court in Green Garden has elevated contractual language to
immutable law between the parties while ignoring prior jurispru-
dence. If the court meant to overrule Boutte and Aiavolasiti, it
should have said so. If Boutte and Aiavolasiti are distinguishable,
the court should have explained their distinguishing features. What
is not desirable is the court's avoiding reference to any relevant
prior jurisprudence.
How far the court will allow contractual language to alter the
usual strict construction given to security devices remains to be
seen. For example, will the court allow parties to stipulate in an or-
dinary mortgage that payment will not extinguish the mortgage pro
rata? 6 May parties agree to the creation of security devices not
authorized by statute?27
Since the advent of Boutte, Louisiana has needed a comprehen-
sive judicial analysis of the rights of all parties (creditor, debtor, and
surety) in situations involving notes or contracts by which sureties
bind themselves in solido with the principal debtor. Green Garden is
not a case in which such an analysis can be found.
COLLATERAL MORTGAGES
In the last faculty symposium, the case of Kaplan v. University
25. See, e.g., Texas Co. v. Couvillon, 148 So. 295, 296 (Orl. App. 1933):
It must be borne in mind, too, that the surety is entitled to a strict construction
of his contract. He is protected from any interpretation of his contract not resting
on clear expression or plain implication. The Code declares that suretyship is not
to be presumed, should be expressed, and is to be restricted within the limits in-
tended. Civ. Code, art. 3039; New Orleans Canal & Banking Co. v. Hagan, 1 La.
Ann. 62; Freeland v. Briscoe, 3 La. Ann. 257.
26. LA. CIv. CODE art. 3285 provides in part: "In all cases where the principal debt
is extinguished, the mortgage disappears with it." See Thrift Funds Canal, Inc. v. Foy,
261 La. 573, 260 So. 2d 628 (1972); Mente & Co. v. Levy, 160 La. 496, 107 So. 318 (1926).
27. See, e.g., Wayside Dev. Co. v. Post, 338 So. 2d 1173 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976) (a
creditor unsuccessfully attempted to gain secured status by recording a service con-
tract in the public records). See also American Bank & Trust Co. v. Louisiana Savings
Ass'n, 386 So.2d 96 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980) (the court was unsure of the type of secur-
ity device a contract created but nevertheless allowed enforcement of the contractual
right in preference to the claim of other purportedly secured creditors).
19811
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Lake Corporation8 was noted.29 After the prior article had been
printed, a rehearing was granted.
Reaffirming prior jurisprudence, the Kaplan court on its original
hearing had held that a handnote is imprescriptible when secured by
the pledge of a collateral mortgage note, regardless of whether the
collateral mortgage note had prescribed. This issue was not ex-
amined on the rehearing; the court confined its reexamination of the
case to the personal liability of a purchaser of the property who had
assumed all "valid" encumbrances," but who had not assumed ex-
pressly the obligations contained in the handnote or the collateral
mortgage note.
Because the court found that the collateral mortgage note had
prescribed prior to the purchaser's act of assumption, the court
found that the collateral mortgage was not a valid encumbrance and
thus the purchaser had no personal liability.
Traditionally a collateral mortgage note is a demand instrument
so that, in case of default in the payment of the principal obligation,
the creditor can execute his rights against the property immedi-
ately." Since the obligation 2 the collateral mortgage secures
matures in less than nine years, the mortgage retains effect on the
public records as to third parties for ten years.3 Several sales with
assumptions occurred prior to the ultimate purchaser's acquisition in
Kaplan. Why each of these assumptions did not operate as an
acknowledgment of the mortgage note and as a reinscription of the
mortgage itself was not discussed by the court. It would appear,
from the facts, that the collateral mortgage note had not prescribed.
A sale with assumption of a mortgage creates solidary liability be-
tween the purchaser and seller in favor of the creditor.34 Each act of
assumption operates to interrupt prescription on the obligation be-
ing secured." Since third parties were not involved, the question of
reinscription of the mortgage under Civil Code Article 3369 is not
relevant.
28. 381 So. 2d 385 (La. 1980).
29. 1978-1979 Term, supra note 15, at 577.
30. 381 So. 2d at 390.
31. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3170.
32. I.e., the demand collateral mortgage note.
33. LA. CIv. CODE art. 3369.
34. Simon v. McMeel, 167 La. 243, 119 So. 35 (1928); Federal Land Bank of New
Orleans v. Cook, 179 La. 857, 155 So. 249 (1934); Schlatre v. Greaud, 19 La. Ann. 124
(1867).
35. "Moreover, prescription on this note was interrupted or suspended quoad this
defendant when she assumed its payment as part of the purchase price .... Simon v.
McMeel, 167 La. 243 at 247, 119 So. 35 at 36.
36. LA. CIv. CODE art. 3344; Schutzman v. Dobrowolski, 191 La. 791, 186 So. 338
(1939).
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Kaplan brings certainty to the area of collateral mortgages in
holding that the collateral mortgage note is imprescriptible 7 The
cautious counsel for creditors, after Kaplan, will want to make cer-
tain that the act of mortgage or collateral pledge agreement con-
tains specific language allowing the creditor to declare a default in
the obligation if a mortgagor does not sign the necessary documents
to acknowledge the collateral mortgage note38 or to reinscribe the
collateral mortgage.
A continuing debate among lawyers is whether a collateral mort-
gage note creates personal liability for the maker or whether the
collateral mortgage package itself is a type of "in rem" mortgage. 9
Central Bank v. Bishop ° gives support to those who contend that
the collateral mortgage note is an enforceable personal obligation.
The court held that interest should be calculated on a collateral
mortgage note from the date it is signed, not from the date it is
pledged nor from the date money was advanced on the principal
obligation.
THE DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT ACT
The Deficiency Judgment Act41 prevents a creditor from collect-
ing personally from the debtor more than is brought at a judicial
sale unless the requirements of the Act are followed.42 While the
Deficiency Judgment Act refers expressly only to judicial sales by
executory process, it has been extended to preclude deficiency
judgments after nonjudicial sales. 3
At least two distinct public policy arguments exist in favor of
the Act. The Act obviously is designed to prevent a creditor from
37. This writer still stands by his previous criticism of the original decision in
Kaplan. 1978-1979 Tern, supra note 15, at 577.
38. As long as the debtor or his co-debtors in solido make payments on the prin-
cipal obligation, each payment will operate as an interruption of prescription on the
collateral mortgage note. LA. R.S. 9:5807 (Supp. 1970).
39. This writer is of the opinion that a collateral mortgage note does create per-
sonal liability for the maker; however, the maker can be liable for no more than the ex-
tent of the principal obligation that was secured by the pledge of the collateral mort-
gage note. See 1978-1979 Term, supra, note 15, at 582.
40. 375 So. 2d 149 (La. App. 2d Cir.), cert. denied, 378 So. 2d 435 (La. 1979).
41. LA. R.S. 13:4106-07 (1950 & Supp. 1952).
42. To obtain a deficiency judgment, the property must be appraised. LA. CODE
Civ. P. art. 2332. The property, after appraisal, must be sold at two-thirds of the ap-
praised value. If that price is not obtained, a second sale may be held, at which point
the property may be sold "for cash for whatever it will bring, except as provided in
Article 2337." LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 2336. In any event, the price must be sufficient to
discharge the costs of the sale and any superior mortgages, liens, or encumbrances.
LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 2337.
43. Farmerville Bank v. Sheen, 76 So. 2d 581 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1955); Home Fin.
Service v. Walmsley, 176 So. 415 (Orl. App. 1937).
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collecting more than the amount due." A second rationale, however,
also can be discerned in the requirement that the property must be
sold for two-thirds of its appraised value at the first judicial sale.4 5 If
judicial sales were in fact true public auctions, no minimum bid re-
quirement would be needed because the auction would always bring
the fair market value of the property. The requirement that the prop-
erty be sold for two-thirds of its appraised value represents recogni-
tion of the fact that, at most judicial sales, there is no adverse bid-
ding and the purchaser is usually the seizing creditor. Over the past
five years a number of cases have been decided in which debtors at-
tempted to defend against deficiency judgments after judicial sales,
alleging that either appraisal formalities were not properly complied
with or that the appraisal itself was somehow invalid
because it did not reflect the true fair market value of the property.
With one notable exception, 6 these attacks have been rejected.47
Two difficult problems arise in conjunction with nonjudicial
sales. The first is whether any nonjudicial sale can meet the re-
quirements of procedural due process. In 1969 the United States
Supreme Court, in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corporation,48 held
that prejudgment seizures of property without judicial intervention
or oversight violated the fourteenth amendment's guarantee of pro-
cedural due process. Sniadach's rationale was expanded, in Fuentes
v. Shevin,49 to include any seizures of property that deny the owner
the right to be heard before the property is taken. Sniadach and
Fuentes represented the high-water mark of due process protection
for debtors. The Court subsequently backed away from these strin-
gent requirements in Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Company,5" a case in-
volving Louisiana's sequestration provisions. Finally, in Flagg
44. For example, assume a $100,000 loan is secured by a mortgage on property.
Further assume that upon the debtor's default the creditor "purchases" the property
for $20,000 and then seeks a $80,000 deficiency judgment against the debtor. If the
property, in fact, is worth $100,000, the creditor reaps a windfall at the debtor's ex-
pense. The purpose of appraisal is to prevent such an occurrence. If the creditor
decides to forego appraisal, the law assumes he is willing to be made whole only by
seizure and sale of the security and to release the personal liability of the principal
obligor.
45. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 2336.
46. General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Boutte, 338 So. 2d 363 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1976).
47. Ardoin v. Fontenot, 374 So. 2d 1273 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979); Fidelity Nat'l
Bank of Baton Rouge v. Pitchford, 374 So. 2d 149 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1979); John Deere
Indus. Equip. Co. v. Luther, 352 So. 2d 761 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977); First Nat'l Bank of
Lafayette v. Doni Homes, Inc., 338 So. 2d 1202 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976).
48. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
49. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
50. 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
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Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks,5 the Court sanctioned private, pre-judicial
sales when authorized by state law. The Court held that a
warehouseman did not violate the provisions of procedural due pro-
cess when it sold, pursuant to state law, stored goods because of the
failure of the debtor to pay storage charges. While the case may be
distinguished from prejudgment seizures, 2 the language of the ma-
jority opinion is so broad that it now appears that the Court, as it
currently is constituted, will reject future constitutional challenges
to prejudgment private seizures and sales. 3
The second problem of nonjudicial sales is how far the public
policy provisions of the Deficiency Judgment Act will be stretched.
The latest case that has limited the application of the Deficiency
Judgment Act is International City Bank & Trust Co. v. Zander.54 In
Zander the court held that the Deficiency Judgment Act did not ap-
ply to the sale of stock listed on a national exchange. The court
noted that there is no better arbiter of the price of stock than that
price which it brings at any moment on the exchange. Thus the
creditor, having disposed of the stock, was not prohibited from col-
lecting a deficiency judgment. Whether the rationale of Zander can
be expanded remains to be seen. It may be argued that the Deficiency
Judgment Act should not apply to sales of stock that are sold "over
the counter 5 or to those items sold on national or regional com-
modity exchanges.
PLEDGE OF STOCK
A creditor who grants a loan secured by the pledge of stock of a
closely held corporation can exercise several precautions to make
sure that his security does not dissipate. The principal concern of
the creditor is to make sure that the corporation is run in a business-
like manner. To this end, the creditor may desire a seat on the
board of directors, the power to vote the pledged stock, or both. A
problem arises in trying to obtain the right to vote the stock,
however, because it has been held that a mere pledgee cannot vote
pledged stock unless the shares are transferred on the books of the
corporation to the pledgee.56 Creating the right of the pledgee to
51. 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
52. In Flagg Brothers the warehouseman was already in possession of the mer-
chandise, and the goods secured a legal not a consensual lien; furthermore, the
warehouseman was not seeking a deficiency judgment.
53. See Justice Steven's dissent in Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 168
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
54. 378 So. 2d 506 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979).
55. I.e., stocks listed by the NASDAQ.
56. Emile M. Babst Co. v. Commercial Enterprises, Inc., 274 So. 2d 742 (La. App.
4th Cir.), cert. denied, 277 So. 2d 673 (La. 1973).
19811
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vote the stock through a voting trust has its own difficulties
because a voting trust is allowed only between two or more
shareholders, not between a shareholder and a creditor.
Two cases from the fourth circuit have dealt with these issues.
Defelice v. Garon" held that a creditor may acquire, by contract, the
right to vote the stock from the pledgee. If such a contract exists,
the corporation must transfer the stock to the name of the pledgee.
In First Metropolitan Bank v. Plaia,59 the pledge agreement did not
expressly authorize the creditor to vote the stock; however, it did
authorize him to sell the stock upon default. The court, noting that
"the right to sell would have little value if not coupled with the
right to have the stock transferred, ' held the agreement sufficient
both to allow the creditor to vote the stock and to require the cor-
poration to transfer the certificate to the creditor's name.
The cautious practioner, in drafting pledge agreements on closed
corporation stock, may want not only to include a provision allowing
the creditor to vote the stock and to sell it at a private sale upon
default,6 but also one or more of the following provisions:
(1) Requiring the corporation to pass an amendment to its ar-
ticles or bylaws prohibiting the corporation from mortgaging
or encumbering any of its assets without prior notice to the
pledgee;
(2) Prohibiting the corporation from issuing any more stock
without the prior notice to and consent of the pledge;
(3) Entering into a written stock restriction, the existence of
which is noted on all share certificates, prohibiting the sale
of any corporate stock without the consent of the pledgee;
(4) Prohibiting any change of officers, directors, or the cor-
porate structure without the pledgee's affirmative consent.
While these clauses may be of questionable enforceability as to
third persons absent a change in the articles or bylaws, they at least
should be considered by the creditor before making the loan.
FEDERAL TAX LIENS VERSUS LOUISIANA SECURITY DEVICES
Under the Federal Tax Lien Act of 196662 a federal tax lien that
57. LA. R.S. 12:78 (Supp. 1968).
58. 380 So. 2d 676 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980).
59. 384 So. 2d 560 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980).
60. Id. at 564-65.
61. Civil Code article 3165 expressly allows a private sale of pledged stock. For a
review of a potential conflict this creates in conjunction with the Deficiency Judgment
Act, see Comment, Deficiency Judgments in Louisiana, 49 TUL. L. REV. 1094 (1975).
62. 26 U.S.C. § 7401.
[Vol. 41
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW, 19 79-1980
is inferior to other encumbrances will survive a judicial proceeding
or other sale unless the provisions of the federal act are followed. In
Myers v. United States,3 a creditor invoked a sale by executory pro-
cess. Federal tax liens were recorded properly more than thirty
days prior to the sale; however, the federal government was not
notified of the sale. The federal act distinguishes between "judicial
proceedings" in which the government must be joined as a party
and "other sales" in which the government need not be joined as a
party but must be given notice prior to the sale.64 The court noted
that while executory process is "'judicial' in that it requires the use
of the courts . . . it is clearly not a plenary judicial proceeding";5
therefore, the "other sales" provisions of the act apply, and the
government must be given prior notice. Because the government
was not given prior notice, the inferior federal lien was not ex-
tinguished by the judicial sale.
Federal tax liens affect movable as well as immovable
property.6 In Abbadie's IGA Supermarket, Inc. v. Barousse,"7 a chat-
tel mortgage certificate was obtained prior to the sale of a grocery
business. The certificate did not show the recorded federal tax lien.
The court held that the clerk had no liability for failure to show the
tax lien on the chattel mortgage certificate because Louisiana's
Federal Tax Lien Registration Act 8 requires clerks to maintain
separate federal tax lien indices; the federal tax lien need not be
shown under the chattel mortgage index. The cautious practioner,
prior to passing an act of sale involving the acquisition of movables,
should check not only the chattel mortgage index but also the
federal tax lien index. 9
THE PUBLIC WORKS ACTS
Slagle-Johnson Lumber Company, Inc. v. Landis Construction
Company"0 overruled H.R. Hayes' Lumber Company v. McConnell71
63. 483 F. Supp. 1154 (W.D. La. 1980).
64. Compare 26 U.S.C. § 7425(a) with § 7425(b).
65. 483 F. Supp. at 1159.
66. 26 U.S.C. § 6321.
67. 378 So. 2d 591 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979).
68. LA. R.S. 9:5251-66 (1950).
69. 1980 La. Acts, No. 235, added R.S. 9:5367-72, which allows a chattel mortgage
on fixtures, furniture, and equipment (but not on inventory) by a simple description in
a chattel mortgage or a mortgage on an immovable. Therefore, there will be occasions
when an effective chattel mortgage is recorded in the immovable property mortgage
records.
70. 379 So. 2d 479 (La. 1980).
71. 176 La. 431, 146 So. 14 (1932).
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and held that a supplier of materials is entitled to a lien whenever
materials are furnished for the construction of a public work,
whether they are incorporated in the edifice or merely consumed
during construction. Therefore, the supplier of lumber and nails used
to build concrete forms was entitled to assert a lien because the
materials, although not physically incorporated in the building, were
consumed during construction,
PRIVATE WORKS ACT
Deciphering the convoluted language of the Private Works Act"2
is never easy. If a contract is not recorded, the time for filing the
lien is sixty days. When, however, does the sixty-day period begin to
run? The statute provides that if no affidavit of completion is
recorded, the lien must be filed: "Within sixty days after the date of
the last delivery of all material upon the said property or the last
furnishing of services or the last performance of labor upon the
same, by the said furnisher of materials or services or the said
laborer .... ""
George Kellett & Sons, Inc. v. Dobbs74 held that despite the
seemingly literal terms of the statute, "the jurisprudence has inter-
preted the statute to provide a supplier with a cause of action even
though recordation is made beyond sixty days if it occurs within sixty
days after the last date on which any material was supplied or work
was performed on the job by anyone."75
The time for filing a lien in the case of an unrecorded contract
was also an issue in Jonesboro State Bank v. Tucker."6 The court
held that the sixty-day period commences upon "any unexplained
and complete cessation of all work";77 the owner's subjective intent
whether or not to abandon the project is not determinative. Because
a lien affidavit had not been filed within sixty days after complete
cessation of all work, the privilege was lost.
If a lien is improperly filed, attorney's fees are awardable under
R.S. 9:4821. Welch v. Daigrepont8 interpreted the statute as grant-
ing attorney's fees only if the lien claimant has been sent a letter re-
questing cancellation. Since the lien had been cancelled prior to
72. LA. R.S. 9:4801-21 (1950).
73. LA. R.S. 9:4812 (Supp. 1966) (emphasis added).
74. 380 So. 2d 758 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980).
75. Id. at 759.
76. 381 So. 2d 578 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1980).
77. Id. at 581.
78. 378 So. 2d 607 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979).
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receipt of the demand letter, the owner was not entitled to
attorney's fees.
The Residential Truth and Construction Act"9 provides a cause
of action8" for a private owner against a contractor who fails to give
a notice of lien rights. Landry v. Racca1 held that a contractor is
liable for damages and attorney's fees when the required notice is
not given and liens are later filed.
The Residential Truth and Construction Act has an admirable
title; the form of the required notice to be given to owners,
however, contains legalistic jargon and extensive statutory citations
meaningless to a residential homeowner.82 A revision of the notice
itself would be desirable. It should be written in language readily
understandable by laymen. The following is suggested:
NOTICE OF LIEN RIGHTS
If your residential property is under construction or if your residen-
tial property is being improved, there is a possibility that a lien may
be filed against your property. If a lien is filed, your property is
seized and sold by a court of law to satisfy the lien.
Who gets a lien?
Your general contractor gets a lien if you have a written contract
with him that is recorded in the public records. Anyone else who
works on the property, any laborers, and anyone who supplies
materials to the property are also entitled to a lien regardless of
whether you have a written contract with your general contractor.
What is a lien?
If the people who are entitled to a lien are not paid, they can file a
notice in the public records. This notice acts like a mortgage on your
property. They have a right to file this lien if they are not paid by
the general contractor even if you have paid the general contractor.
79. LA. R.S. 9:4851-55 (Supp. 1976).
80. LA. R.S. 9:4855 (Supp. 1976).
81. 386 So. 2d 1013 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980).
82. E.g., the notice must state the following:
that said contractor is about to begin improving my residential property accord-
ing to the terms and conditions of a contract, and that in accordance with the pro-
visions of law in Part I of Chapter 2 of Code Title XXI of Title 9 of the Louisiana
Revised Statutes of 1950, R.S. 9:4801, et seq ....
LA. R.S. 9:4852 (Supp. 1976).
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How can I avoid a lien being placed on my property?
You can avoid a lien being placed on your property by entering into
a written contract with your general contractor. This contract must
be recorded in the mortgage records of the parish where your
residential property is located. The contract must be recorded prior
to work's beginning on the property. The contractor must furnish a
bond that meets the requirements of law.
I have received this notice from my contractor on this __ day of
_, 19__.
Owner
